Immigration Politics and Partisan Realignment*

James E. Monogan III
University of Georgia
monogan@uga.edu

February 13, 2012

Abstract

This article demonstrates how the party identification of various demographic groups in California, Texas, and the United States as a whole moved after the gubernatorial campaigns of Pete Wilson and George W. Bush. It presents aggregated time series of Field Poll, Texas Poll, American National Election Study, General Social Survey, and Gallup data. Change point analyses of these data indicate that Wilson harmed the Republican coalition in California and the nation, while Bush helped the Texas Republican party. Further, Bush's presidency undid much of the harm Wilson brought on the Republican party among Hispanics.

1

In 1994, a clear divide emerged within the Republican party regarding how best to deal with America's growing Latino population. On one hand, Pete Wilson made support of ballot Proposition 187—a measure to stop illegal immigrants from receiving services—a centerpiece of his campaign. With racially-charged television ads, his campaign is widely thought to have damaged Republicans' long-term prospects among Latino voters in California. However, George W. Bush simultaneously sought his first term as governor of Texas swearing-off the politics of racial threat. By instead addressing large Latino gatherings, where he spoke a little Spanish and argued that his education proposal could help Latinos, many believed Bush made inroads for Republicans among Latinos. Both Wilson and Bush won against strong opponents, albeit on the coattails of the Gingrich revolution. Accomplishing their short-term goals, to what degree did the different strategies have effects in the long term? Further, which candidate, if either, had a bigger influence on the respective state partisan landscape?

By considering the impact of 1994 gubernatorial elections on party identification, this article expands the literature on realignment to consider how subnational factors may shape local-level affiliations. Much prior research on mass partisan changes focuses on national-level influence on the entire American electorate, whether the cause is critical elections (Sundquist 1983), issue evolution (Adams 1997; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Wolbrecht 2000), or responses to current political and economic conditions (Brandt and Freeman 2009; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002; MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1989). If governors' stances on immigration shape the partisanship of ethnic groups within their state, then it is important that such leaders recognize the potential long-term consequences of their actions. To assess the significance of the 1994 California and Texas campaigns, this article proceeds first by reviewing the background to these elections, second by analyzing partisanship by race and state over time, third by looking at the overall partisan landscape in California, and finally by considering the implications

of these findings.

1 Background

In one sense, it seems natural that immigration became a major issue in California in 1994 because San Diego was a highly active point of entry for illegal immigrants at the time. Yet historically speaking, it is somewhat surprising that California was the state where Republicans used racial threat in 1994 while Texas was the state where it was disavowed. Overt discrimination against Mexican-Americans had largely disappeared in both states by the late 1960s (Barone 2001: 177). If anything, outright discrimination prior to the civil rights movement had been a bigger issue in Texas (Peirce and Hagstrom 1984: 651). Further, in Texas thoughtout the 1960s, Latinos associated primarily with the Democratic party since nearly all elected officials were Democratic in a Solid South state (Barone 2001: 183). Even into the 1970s and 1980s, Latino elected officials from Texas were principally Democrats (Peirce and Hagstrom 1984: 52-53). Hence, despite the middle and upper class nature of Latino organizations in the state, Texas Latinos had strong ties to the Democratic party. Meanwhile, in California before the 1990s, Latinos had traditionally been seen as swing group targeted by both parties (Barone 2001: 181), even though most Californian Latino organizations had ties to the Chicano Movement. All of which suggests that for a California Republican candidate to invoke the politics of racial threat and a Texas Republican candidate to reach-out to Latino voters was a clear contrast from the past in each state. The 1994 election, therefore, had real potential to shake-up partisan coalitions.

1.1 The 1994 Elections

To understand how Bush and Wilson's campaign strategies influenced long-term partisanship, it is worthwhile to consider first how the campaigns played-out in the context of 1994. Starting with California, Pete Wilson had been elected in 1990 after a tight race with Dianne Feinstein. Taking office in 1991, he inherited a huge budget deficit.[1] Further, the national economy took a major downturn in the early 1990s, dealing Wilson a tough political hand. By the end of his first year in office, Wilson had already vetoed a bill funding English-language classes for immigrants and began to blame legal and illegal foreign immigrants for imposing disproportionate costs on the California state budget (Associated Press 1991; Reinhold 1991). It is intriguing that Wilson made these choices because earlier in his career, as a U.S. senator, he voted for the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986—a law written by Alan Simpson and Romano Mazzoli that included provisions such as amnesty for illegal immigrants residing in the United States prior to 1982. Despite this background, after Bill Clinton was elected in 1992, Wilson trumpeted the fiscal stress caused by immigrants even more, blaming the federal government for mandating the distribution of benefits without providing funding. In 1993, he and the governors of Texas, Florida, New York, and Illinois sued the federal government to reimburse the states for the costs created by undocumented immigrants (Weintraub 1993).

1.2 Pete Wilson's Re-Election Bid

Perhaps because of the sour economy, Wilson started his re-election bid trailing challenger Kathleen Brown by over twenty percentage points in horserace polls (Wroe 2008: 82). Hence, his chances for re-election looked slim at first.

Meanwhile, Republican state Senator Dick Mountjoy, along with a committee of ac-

---

[1] A $14.3 billion gap in his first year in office (Reinhold 1991).

tivists, proposed a ballot initiative entitled "Save Our State" that would outlaw the provision of state services to illegal immigrants (Wroe 2008: 56-61). However, late in the filing process, it looked as if the initiative, which the Secretary of State labeled Proposition 187, would not make the ballot due to a lack of signatures.[2] The California Republican Party decided to throw its support behind the measure, raising money to pay professional signature gatherers to push the proposition over the critical threshold (Nicholson 2005: 96-97). By aligning itself with the initiative, the Republican Party set the stage for its candidates, including Wilson, to make Proposition 187 a centerpiece of the campaign.

Indeed, Wilson ran campaign advertisements which showed fuzzy footage of people crossing the border and a narrator saying: "They keep coming: two million illegal immigrants in California."[3] The ads closed with a frame urging voters to support both Wilson and Prop. 187. The racial priming of the ad was reminiscent of George H.W. Bush's 1988 Willie Horton ad, in that both presumably won the votes of whites by invoking racial fear, much like the campaign practices Key (1949) described in the pre-Civil Rights Act South. Meanwhile, Kathleen Brown publicly opposed the initiative, offering a clear contrast to Wilson on the immigration issue.

Wilson's strategy seemed to work, as both he and Proposition 187 won, by 14.56 and 17.86 percentage points, respectively.[4] Alvarez and Butterfield (2000) argue that Prop. 187 was popular due to cyclical nativism driven by economic downturn. Further, the Field Poll indicated that 57% of voters thought Prop. 187 would save the state millions of dollars (Newton 2008: 57). All of this allowed Wilson to overcome Brown's huge lead early in the campaign to win re-election. The exit poll in Table 1 indicates that Wilson

---

[2]To place an initiative on the ballot, California requires signatures from a number of voters equal to 5% of those who voted for governor in the previous election (California Secretary of State's Office: http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/initiative_guide.htm).

[3]Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o0f1PE8Kzng

[4]Source: The California Secretary of State, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/election-results.htm (accessed 27 November 2009). Wilson won 55.18%–40.62%; Proposition 187 won 58.93%–41.07%.

won the white vote by a thirty percentage point margin, which carried him to victory. Hence, if Wilson embraced Prop. 187 with a goal of garnering white support, his winning coalition seemed to reflect that strategy.

Table 1: Reported Vote Choice in 1994 California Gubernatorial, by Race

Vote Choice	Race				Total
	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	
Brown	35%	79%	73%	49%	43%
	(774)	(185)	(188)	(83)	(1230)
Wilson	65%	21%	27%	51%	57%
	(1454)	(49)	(71)	(86)	(1660)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(2228)	(234)	(259)	(169)	(2890)

Notes: $\chi^2_{3\ df} = 281$ ($p < .001$). Cell entries are column percentages. Survey weighted frequencies in parentheses. Raw sample size prior to weighting: $N = 2934$.

Although Wilson won in 1994, many have argued that his campaign damaged long-term Republican prospects in California by alienating the party from the growing Hispanic demographic (Bowler, Nicholson and Segura 2006; Diamond 1996; Nicholson 2005; Whalen 2002). In fact, even at the time, a number of prominent Republicans opposed Wilson's strategy: Bill Bennett and Jack Kemp argued that immigrants were good for the economy and would make great citizens due to their entrepreneurial spirit and religiosity. Further, Ralph Reed believed Latinos held conservative preferences on many social issues and in 1993 announced that the Christian Coalition would recruit Latino members (Diamond 1996). Hence, there seemed to be a sense among many Republicans that a more forward-looking strategy might be to embrace, rather than alienate, Hispanic voters.

1.3 George W. Bush's Bid for Governor

Another objection to Pete Wilson's anti-immigrant campaign strategy was raised after the election by Texas Governor-Elect George W. Bush. Bush stated that Prop. 187 would be wrong for Texas and argued that, although border controls should be enforced, it was always worthwhile to provide services to children such as education regardless of their origins (Hamburger and Wallsten 2006: 65-67). This argument was consistent with the campaign he had run in the prior year to earn his first elective office. Somewhat oddly, his Democratic opponent, Governor Ann Richards, had been one of Pete Wilson's co-petitioners in 1993 for federal reimbursement for the costs of immigration. Hence, party positions in the Texas gubernatorial were nearly a mirror image of those in California.

Much like Wilson, Bush faced an uphill challenge in his 1994 campaign. In summer 1994, incumbent Ann Richards led Bush in the two-party horse race 52.4% to 47.6%.[5] Unlike Wilson's strategy of campaigning on immigration, though, Bush chose education as his focus and promoted a policy similar to both Bill Clinton's policy as governor of Arkansas and the No Child Left Behind Act that Bush would sign as president. With education, Bush could advance a plan that appealed to conservatives, but on an issue traditionally associated with the Democratic party. Further, education allowed him to argue he had something to offer when speaking to minority voters without raising charged issues like affirmative action. Indeed, he made several campaign stops in principally Latino cities on the border with Mexico where he argued that his plan would be beneficial to heavily Latino schools (Hamburger and Wallsten 2006: 58-61).

Intriguingly, despite all of Bush's efforts to win-over minority voters, exit polls suggest that his electoral support did not differ substantially from Wilson's. Contrasting Tables 1 & 2, Wilson did better with every demographic group except for Hispanic voters, where the poll comparison suggests that Bush did merely one percentage point better

---

[5]Source: The spring 1994 Texas Poll (see appendix for source details).

than Wilson. Perhaps because Wilson was an incumbent seeking re-election, or perhaps because Bush gained less national media attention in 1994, Bush's strategy of reaching-out to minority voters appeared to be less fruitful than Wilson's racially-charged campaign.[6] Though both men won, Wilson's 14.56 point margin was much safer than Bush's 7.6 point margin.[7] Bush still won his first term primarily with white support, but had a smaller share of it than his counterpart in California.

Table 2: Reported Vote Choice in 1994 Texas Gubernatorial, by Race

Vote Choice	Race				Total
	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	
Richards	37%	85%	72%	66%	46%
	(444)	(126)	(145)	(10)	(725)
Bush	63%	15%	28%	34%	54%
	(763)	(23)	(57)	(5)	(848)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(1207)	(149)	(202)	(15)	(1573)

Notes: $\chi^2_{3\,\text{df}} = 187$ ($p < .001$). Cell entries are column percentages. Survey weighted frequencies in parentheses. Raw sample size prior to weighting: $N = 1581$.

2 The Long-Term Consequences for Parties and Candidates

Although Wilson was more immediately successful than Bush, evidence suggests that Bush's strategy yielded longer-term gains. Although Bush only won 28% of the Hispanic vote in 1994, he raised his share to 46% in his successful 1998 re-election bid. Meanwhile, California Republican Dan Lungren only garnered 22% of the Latino vote in his 1998

---

[6]It also should be noted that Latinos who spoke English or were citizens were significantly more likely to support Prop. 187 than noncitizens or those who primarily spoke Spanish (Newton 2000). These results were likely due to differences in perceived threat at the time and consequently meant that Wilson did not experience uniform loss of Latino support in 1994.

[7]Source: The Texas Secretary of State, http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (accessed 27 November 2009). Bush won 53.47%–45.87%.

loss to Gray Davis, a decline even from Wilson's share (Khaligh 2002). Further, Bush went on to do well among Hispanic voters in his two presidential elections, increasing the Republican share of Hispanic votes for president for the first time since 1984, to 35% in 2000 and 44% in 2004 (Sanchez 2007: 166).

But besides the long-term consequences for particular personalities, did the behaviors of these two Republicans have unique effects for the overall party coalitions in their respective states and even nationwide? In other words, to what degree did these campaigns have a lasting impact on voters' willingness to identify with one party or another? To assess the effects of these campaign strategies on party electoral coalitions, Figure 1 shows the time series of Republican and Democratic partisanship for all adults, whites, and Hispanics in California, Texas, and the United States. In each of the panels, the horizontal axis indicates time in years, and the vertical axis indicates the percentage of voters from a demographic identifying with the party. Each panel contains three lines: a solid line indicating the percentage of all voters identifying with the party, a dotted line indicating the percentage of Hispanic voters identifying with the party, and a dashed line indicating the percentage of white voters identifying with a party.[8] The light vertical line in each panel represents 1994. Descriptively, the data fit the story of how various demographic groups would respond to the respective Republican campaign strategies.

In California (see panels 1(a) & 1(b)), the percentage of Hispanic Republicans starts trending downward—while the percentage of Hispanic Democrats quickly shoots upward—following Pete Wilson's re-election. In fact, the trends even seem to begin as early as 1991, when Wilson first began blaming immigrants for budgetary problems (a result first observed by Korey and Lascher 2006). Meanwhile, white partisanship appears to stay fairly stagnant throughout the post-1994 period, with a possible move towards the

---

[8]The California data are from the Field Poll, the Texas data are from the Texas Poll, and the U.S. data are from the American National Election Studies (ANES). Note that the U.S. data in all other figures are based on a combination of ANES and General Social Survey (GSS) data. See the appendix for more details on data sources.

(a) CA Republicans

(b) CA Democrats

(c) TX Republicans

(d) TX Democrats

(e) US Republicans

(f) US Democrats

Figure 1: Republican and Democratic identification among whites, Hispanics, and the overall adult population in California, Texas, and the United States

Democrats, albeit not as strongly as among Hispanics.

In Texas, the series are shorter (see panels 1(c) & 1(d)), but intriguingly show trends that differ substantially from California. In particular, the percentage of Hispanic Republicans trends upward after 1994, in contrast to the downward trend that happens in California and even, to a lesser extent, the entire nation (panel 1(e)). The percentage of Hispanic Democrats in Texas, meanwhile, remains fairly stagnant at this time, while in California and the U.S. as a whole (panel 1(f)), the percentage is shooting upward. Hence, the data descriptively suggest that Bush helped his party with Hispanic voters not only by making small inroads, but by avoiding catastrophes that befell his party in California and the rest of the nation. However, his party seemed to lose some net support among white voters, suggesting that his emphasis on gaining Hispanic voters may have come at some cost. Intriguingly, around 2000 when Bush enters the national political scene, the national trends reverse with a drop in Democratic identification, and a rise in Republican identification among Hispanic voters. Hence, if Wilson and Prop. 187 hurt Republicans nationally, Bush apparently reversed this.

2.1 Change Point Analysis

As a more formal evaluation of the observed changes in the data, I turn to change point analysis, which allows me to test whether the trend in each time series changes after 1994.[9] This analysis of how partisanship is trending resembles the prior study by Korey and Lascher (2006), although in this case the principal focus is on meso-level analysis of how demographic groups responded. Figures 2–4 graph the expected trends from these change point models. In each panel of each figure, the horizontal axis again represents years, and

---

[9]An alternative method would be intervention analysis, as laid-out by (Box and Tiao 1975). Intervention analyses would be more conservative because they would control for an ARIMA noise model, reducing the opportunity for an intervention to have a significant effect. However, such models are restricted to estimating dynamic changes in the mean of a variable given its noise model (which may filter-out a trend), rather than modeling changes in the trend itself.

the vertical axis again represents the percent of the demographic group identifying with the respective party.[10] The solid line is the actual series of partisan identification while the dashed line is the forecasted trend from the change point model.

Figure 2 shows the results for Hispanic party identification in California, Texas, and the nation. In California, the Republicans were benefitting from an upward trend among Hispanic identifiers; however, this trend took a statistically significant downward turn after Wilson's re-election such that Republicans started losing Hispanic identifiers thereafter.[11] Conversely, the percentage of California Hispanics who identified as Democrats dropped considerably from 1969 to 1994, yet Wilson's re-election prompted an immediate boost to Democratic identification followed by a substantially-moderated downward trend. Hence, Wilson's embrace of Proposition 187 appeared to stop the bleeding Democrats were experiencing among the Hispanic constituency.

Among Texas Hispanics, on the other hand, changes in the time trends are not statistically significant; however, the trends are interesting because they run contrary to what is observed in California and the nation as a whole. In particular, Democratic identification among Hispanics is significantly trending upward, but after 1994, it flattens-out and loses significance. This effect is opposite from California and the nation, each of which show a downward trend of Hispanic Democratic identification that is stopped with a jump (albeit in the U.S. the downward trend steepens around 2000). Further, the positive and significant trend in Texas Hispanic Republican identification becomes steeper after 1994. Though this steepening is not statistically significant, there is a clear contrast from the

---

[10]However, the data for the United States in Figures 2–4 are a latent factor score from an algorithm ("extract for R") developed by Stimson (1991). This technique merges cumulative ANES and GSS data. It loses the natural percentage scale, but offers a series with more information and thereby more accurate variance. This contrasts from Figure 1, which only shows ANES data to keep its scale.

[11]More details on model estimates and the results of significance tests are presented in the appendix. The Chow test for every California series is significant, indicating that the trends in all California series changed after the 1994 election. However, the Chow test is only significant for one of the Texas series: white Democrats. This may be attributable to the shorter series in Texas (15 years) compared with California (37 years). For the United States data, all Republican series exhibit significant change points, as does the series for Hispanic Democratic identification. The series for white and total Democratic identification are not significant, however, which reflects the continuity observed in the trends.

(a) CA Republicans


(b) CA Democrats

(c) TX Republicans

(d) TX Democrats

(e) US Republicans

(f) US Democrats

Figure 2: 1994 changepoint model for Hispanic Republican and Democratic identification in California, Texas, and the United States

marked downturn among California Hispanic Republicanism.

Among white voters, Figure 3 shows that Republican identification was rising in Texas and California until it shifted to a downward trend after the 1994 election.[12] Similarly, Democratic identification was essentially flat prior to the 1994 election (with California's level down significantly from a high level in the seventies), but each state demonstrated a small positive trend afterward.[13] The interesting comparison is with the national data, where Democratic identification has trended downward with no substantial change in 1994, and Republican identification spiked before 1994, but also saw a peak around 2006. Aside from the late national peak that does not occur in California (such data are unavailable for Texas) and California's Democratic rebound, the series are pretty similar. There does not appear, then, to be a clear, differential campaign influence on white voters across the states.

Finally, Figure 4 shows the trends for partisanship among the overall adult populations of each state. Consistent with the demographic breakdowns, panels 4(a) & 4(b) show that the overall California Republican coalition was growing until 1994 when it began to decay, and long-term losses among Democratic identifiers were reversed into growth in identifiers in 1994. With Texas, though, Figures 4(c) & 4(d) display upward trends for both parties that do not change much at the changepoint. If anything, Texas Republicanism saw a slight mean shift upward after 1994, while Democratic identification saw a slight downward shift, but the overall direction of movement remained the same. The most intriguing quality of Texas, then, is the absence of Republican losses, which is clearly present in California. Nationally, Republican identification saw a significant step up in the late 1980s and early 1990s, while Democratic identification saw a straight downward trend throughout the recorded series.

---

[12]In California, this downturn is significant at any standard level, but in Texas the change is significant only at the 90% confidence level.

[13]This upturn among Texas white Democrats is the only effect among the Texas series that is significant at the 95% confidence level, and the change in California is also significant at this level.

(a) CA Republicans

(b) CA Democrats

(c) TX Republicans

(d) TX Democrats

(e) US Republicans

(f) US Democrats

Figure 3: 1994 changepoint model for white Republican and Democratic identification in California, Texas, and the United States

(a) CA Republicans

(b) CA Democrats

(c) TX Republicans

(d) TX Democrats

(e) US Republicans

(f) US Democrats

Figure 4: 1994 changepoint model for overall adult Republican and Democratic identification in California, Texas, and the United States

16

Besides the consequences these campaigns appear to have had at the state level, the national level demographic shifts in partisanship indicate the possibility that state-level officeholders can influence partisan coalitions to the degree that they gain national attention. For example, both California and the nation as a whole show a burst in Hispanic Democratic identification following 1994, with California showing bigger and more sustained growth. Since Prop. 187 and the California gubernatorial election garnered so much national media attention, it seems likely that the national Hispanic constituency responded to this information, though not as much as the California Hispanic constituency, for which Prop. 187 was far more salient. Yet, while Wilson's campaign had more national attention in 1994 than Bush's, we see that when Bush takes the national spotlight, he has a turn influencing the Republican coalition. The national growth in Hispanic Republican identifiers after 2000 is significant and descriptively resembles the Hispanic Republican growth in Texas after 1994.[14] Overall, the data and analyses indicate evident changes in mass partisanship, which are contingent on how salient the relevant campaigns are. However, all of these changes are fairly gradual over time, as prior research on party identification indicates (Campbell et al. 1960; MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1989; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 1998).

3   The Broad Balance of Partisanship in California

As a final look at the impact of the 1994 elections, I turn to an analysis of the overall balance of partisanship in California and the United States.[15] In particular, I model macropartisanship, or the percentage of the public that identifies as Democratic among those who identify with one of the two major parties. Macropartisanship serves as a

---

[14]Analysis which adds a second changepoint following the 2000 election does not yield a significant effect for the Hispanic Democratic series, but it does for the Hispanic Republican series: $F_{2,25} = 13.746$ ($p < 0.001$).

[15]Due to data limitations, this exercise cannot be conducted for Texas data.

useful barometer of the party system and has direct electoral consequences (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1989; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 1998; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 1998). Given the meso-level analysis of demographic groups in the previous section, and the evidence that several of these groups responded to subnational stimuli, it is also worth understanding how all of these factors shape the overall partisan balance.

Table 3 presents broad models of macropartisanship. These models include the factors deemed relevant by prior research (in particular, MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1989; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 1998), including lagged macropartisanship, consumer sentiment, political approval of the president, the president's party, and indicator variables for each presidential administration. The lagged value of macropartisanship serves to allow dynamics in the model, wherein each predictor indirectly shapes future values of the outcome variable (Koyck 1954). Consumer sentiment and political approval of the president are coded positively during Democratic administrations and negatively during Republican administrations to capture the effect the value is expected to have on a Democratic-oriented measure of partisanship. Political approval specifically consists of the residuals of a separate model of presidential approval as a function of consumer sentiment, thereby capturing the effect of a president's political perception separate from the economy.

The first two columns of Table 3 present the results of baseline models of quarterly macropartisanship in the United States and in California. The results are fairly similar to each other, as they are to the prior findings of what shapes macropartisanship (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1989; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 1998). Given these baseline results, I now ask whether the 1994 election appeared to shape the partisan balance above and beyond what would be expected in this broader model. To do this, I use the logic of intervention analysis (Box and Tiao 1975). In this way, I determine when the effect of the treatment of Wilson's hard line on immigration began to take effect, if there even is a

18

Table 3: Macropartisanship in the United States and in California, 1969-2006

Parameter	Baseline Model		Intervention Model	
	United States	California	United States	California
Lagged macropartisanship	0.6192	0.3714	0.6135	0.3477
	(0.0567)	(0.0767)	(0.0571)	(0.0769)
Consumer sentiment	0.0656	0.0957	0.0705	0.0835
	(0.0156)	(0.0239)	(0.0166)	(0.0245)
Presidential approval (political)	0.0676	0.0921	0.0694	0.0894
	(0.0152)	(0.0238)	(0.0153)	(0.0236)
Presidential party	−7.4175	−10.3684	−7.6777	−10.0111
	(1.4889)	(2.2448)	(1.5203)	(2.2289)
Post-1994 intervention	—	—	−0.5739	1.9373
			(0.6644)	(0.9798)
Constant	21.7223	35.3537	22.2062	36.1501
	(3.2735)	(4.3231)	(3.3239)	(4.2971)
R^2	0.9385	0.8298	0.9388	0.8345

Notes: $T = 148$. Quarterly time series data. Cell entries are parameter estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. Every coefficient is discernible at the 95% confidence level for a one-tailed test, except for the post-1994 intervention in the United States model. Indicator variables for presidential administrations were included, but not reported. Breusch-Godfrey tests revealed no evidence of serial correlation. Estimates were computed with R 2.14.0.

treatment effect. Following Korey and Lascher (2006), I allow that the intervention may have been as early as 1991, or the beginning of Wilson's term. However, in the context of the broader model, it turns-out that the effect of the election does not emerge until the third quarter of 1995. Presumably, this is because it took time for the anti-Prop. 187 activists to begin to mobilize Hispanic voters to register and support the Democratic Party. As the last two columns in Table 3 show, there is a significant and discernible treatment effect of the intervention on California macropartisanship. However, this effect does not emerge in the United States as a whole.

How substantial was this effect? The analysis suggests that the post-1994 intervention was responsible for an expected 1.94 percentage point increase in Democratic identification in the short term, holding the other predictors constant. Importantly, though, this

is a step intervention in a dynamic model. This means that over time, this effect grew and cumulated. In the long term, this treatment effect produces an expected rise of 2.97 percentage points in Democratic identification among California's adults.[16] Overall, then, the increased success the Democratic Party has had in California over the past few decades could be attributable in some degree to the nearly three percentage point gain in the state's partisan balance that began after the 1994 election.

4   Implications

Though it is possible that the observed effects for 1994 are caused by differing responses to some unknown factor, the unique trends in the two states' data fit the story that partisan realignment can be a localized event. Specifically, the data imply that governors do matter for partisan identification, to the degree that their behavior gains public attention. Consider each situation: As governor, Wilson appeared to produce a bigger partisan shift in his own state than Bush did in his state, and the Wilson effect in California appeared to emerge nationally as well among Hispanics. All of this makes sense given the heavier coverage of Wilson's campaign and Proposition 187. However, when Bush ran for president, thereby garnering national attention, his campaign took its turn in having an effect on national partisanship comparable to the local effect in Texas. Wilson seemed to make the bigger national splash because the backlash in 1994 produced significant changes in both the Hispanic Democratic and Republican series. Bush in 2000, on the other hand, did not shape Hispanic Democratic identification, but did produce a significant upturn in Republican identification, showing that Hispanic voters could be won-over for the Republican party.

Further, even in a broad model of macropartisanship that accounts for presidential

---

[16]In general, the long-term effect is equal to $\frac{\omega_0}{1-\delta_1}$, where ω_0 is the coefficient of the step input and δ_1 is the autoregressive parameter that captures the dynamic effects of the inputs.

terms, economics, and presidential approval, a clear treatment effect of the 1994 elections emerges for California. This is a more substantial result than that which focused on partisanship of demographic groups because it implies that the overall electoral balance between the two parties was affected. Subnational leaders therefore should take note that their actions can have long-term consequences for their party as they craft electoral strategies. Though alienation seems to have a stronger effect in pushing people away and may yield quicker electoral benefits, the data here suggest that even a gubernatorial candidate has an ability to chip into a new demographic for a party. Hence, the forward-looking politician's behavior should not be driven strictly by fear of losing voters, but can also be motivated by the potential for long-term rewards.

A Appendix: Details on Data and Change Point Analyses

A.1 Data Sources

- Index of Consumer Sentiment: Thomson Reuters and the University of Michigan. *Surveys of Consumers.* http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/. (Accessed 11 February 2012.)

- Presidential Approval Ratings: Roper Center Public Opinion Archives. *Presidential Approval Ratings.* http://webapps.ropercenter.uconn.edu/CFIDE/roper/presidential/webroot/presidential_rating.cfm. (Accessed 11 February 2012.)

- United States quarterly macropartisanship: Roper Center Public Opinion Archives. *iPoll Databank.* Gallup surveys archived from the entire period. Studies of likely voters or registered voters were excluded, as were fifteen personal studies for George H.W. Bush. http://webapps.ropercenter.uconn.edu/CFIDE/cf/action/ipoll. (Accessed 11 February 2012.)

- 1994 California and Texas exit polls: Voter News Service. Voter News Service General Election Exit Polls, 1994 [Computer file]. ICPSR06520-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2007-09-14. doi:10.3886/ICPSR06520, http://icpsr.org. (Accessed 24 November 2009.)

- California partisanship series: The Field Poll Cumulative File, 1956-2008, http://ucdata.berkeley.edu/. (Accessed 30 June 2009.)

- Texas partisanship series: The Texas Poll, 1984-1997, courtesy of the Public Policy Research Institute at Texas A&M University (via James Dyer and Allison Murphy) and the Office of Survey Research at the University of Texas (via O'Neil Provost).

- United States annual partisanship series:

  - Cumulative American National Election Study, 1948-2004,
    http://www.electionstudies.org/. (Accessed 12 November 2009).

  - Cumulative General Social Survey, 1972-2008, http://www.norc.org/GSS+
    Website/. (Accessed 12 November 2009).

A.2 Change Point Model Theory

For each partisanship series for each demographic group in California, Texas, and the United States, I specify the following model:

$$y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 t + \beta_2 I_{1994} + \beta_3 t \times I_{1994} + \epsilon_t \tag{1}$$

In equation 1, y_t represents the proportion identifying with a party, t represents time, I_{1994} is a dummy equal to 0 for all years through 1994 and 1 for all years thereafter, and ϵ_t is a stochastic disturbance. This model specifies that partisanship is a linear trend over time, but the slope and intercept of the trend line shift after 1994. A Chow test of whether the change point alters the trend in y_t is simply an F-test of whether β_2 & β_3 are jointly significant (Chow 1960; Greene 2003: 130-131).

A.3 Change Point Results

The following tables show the estimated parameters from equation 1 when applied to each series, along with the results of the Chow tests.

Table 4: Hispanic Partisanship in California, Texas, and the United States, Changepoint Analysis

Input variable	Estimate	Std. Error	p-value
California Democrats			
Intercept	0.746	0.019	0.000
Post-1994	-0.169	0.121	0.086
Time trend	-0.016	0.001	0.000
Post-1994 $\times$ time trend	0.011	0.004	0.005
$N = 37$, $R^2 = 0.864$, Chow test: $F_{2,33} = 19.433$ ($p < 0.001$)			
California Republicans			
Intercept	0.111	0.016	0.000
Post-1994	0.181	0.106	0.049
Time trend	0.005	0.001	0.000
Post-1994 $\times$ time trend	-0.010	0.003	0.005
$N = 37$, $R^2 = 0.451$, Chow test: $F_{2,33} = 12.731$ ($p < 0.001$)			
Texas Democrats			
Intercept	0.365	0.040	0.000
Post-1994	0.121	0.376	0.377
Time trend	0.014	0.006	0.018
Post-1994 $\times$ time trend	-0.015	0.028	0.306
$N = 15$, $R^2 = 0.364$, Chow test: $F_{2,11} = 0.985$ ($p = 0.404$)			
Texas Republicans			
Intercept	0.152	0.012	0.000
Post-1994	-0.081	0.109	0.237
Time trend	0.004	0.002	0.032
Post-1994 $\times$ time trend	0.006	0.008	0.249
$N = 15$, $R^2 = 0.486$, Chow test: $F_{2,11} = 0.296$ ($p = 0.750$)			
United States Democrats			
Intercept	43.029	0.734	0.000
Post-1994	18.219	2.491	0.000
Time trend	-0.325	0.072	0.000
Post-1994 $\times$ time trend	-0.711	0.120	0.000
$N = 31$, $R^2 = 0.883$, Chow test: $F_{2,27} = 28.248$ ($p < 0.001$)			
United States Republicans			
Intercept	-1.538	0.354	0.000
Post-1994	-1.888	1.202	0.064
Time trend	0.135	0.035	0.000
Post-1994 $\times$ time trend	0.020	0.058	0.363
$N = 31$, $R^2 = 0.562$, Chow test: $F_{2,27} = 4.607$ ($p = 0.019$)			

Table 5: White Partisanship in California, Texas, and the United States, Changepoint Analysis

Input variable	Estimate	Std. Error	p-value
California Democrats			
Intercept	0.496	0.013	0.000
Post-1994	-0.259	0.084	0.002
Time trend	-0.009	0.001	0.000
Post-1994 × time trend	0.012	0.003	0.000
$N = 37$, $R^2 = 0.806$, Chow test: $F_{2,33} = 21.152$ ($p < 0.001$)			
California Republicans			
Intercept	0.337	0.013	0.000
Post-1994	0.139	0.082	0.051
Time trend	0.002	0.001	0.004
Post-1994 × time trend	-0.006	0.003	0.017
$N = 37$, $R^2 = 0.233$, Chow test: $F_{2,33} = 4.554$ ($p = 0.018$)			
Texas Democrats			
Intercept	0.276	0.011	0.000
Post-1994	-0.291	0.106	0.010
Time trend	-0.001	0.002	0.218
Post-1994 × time trend	0.023	0.008	0.008
$N = 15$, $R^2 = 0.424$, Chow test: $F_{2,11} = 4.050$ ($p = 0.048$)			
Texas Republicans			
Intercept	0.333	0.015	0.000
Post-1994	0.216	0.145	0.082
Time trend	0.006	0.002	0.011
Post-1994 × time trend	-0.015	0.011	0.091
$N = 15$, $R^2 = 0.672$, Chow test: $F_{2,11} = 1.178$ ($p = 0.344$)			
United States Democrats			
Intercept	46.072	0.349	0.000
Post-1994	-1.712	3.352	0.306
Time trend	-0.348	0.014	0.000
Post-1994 × time trend	0.042	0.068	0.271
$N = 57$, $R^2 = 0.965$, Chow test: $F_{2,53} = 0.388$ ($p = 0.680$)			
United States Republicans			
Intercept	27.391	0.954	0.000
Post-1994	2.243	9.154	0.404
Time trend	0.050	0.039	0.103
Post-1994 × time trend	0.028	0.185	0.440
$N = 57$, $R^2 = 0.381$, Chow test: $F_{2,53} = 3.286$ ($p = 0.045$)			

Table 6: Total Partisanship in California, Texas, and the United States, Changepoint Analysis

Input variable	Estimate	Std. Error	p-value
California Democrats			
Intercept	0.665	0.021	0.000
Post-1994	-0.335	0.111	0.002
Time trend	-0.009	0.001	0.000
Post-1994 × time trend	0.010	0.003	0.000
$N = 37$, $R^2 = 0.845$, Chow test: $F_{2,34} = 25.193$ ($p < 0.001$)			
California Republicans			
Intercept	0.293	0.023	0.000
Post-1994	0.188	0.125	0.071
Time trend	0.001	0.001	0.083
Post-1994 × time trend	-0.005	0.003	0.033
$N = 37$, $R^2 = 0.280$, Chow test: $F_{2,34} = 4.867$ ($p = 0.014$)			
Texas Democrats			
Intercept	0.307	0.020	0.000
Post-1994	-0.089	0.190	0.325
Time trend	0.004	0.003	0.126
Post-1994 × time trend	0.005	0.014	0.369
$N = 15$, $R^2 = 0.147$, Chow test: $F_{2,11} = 0.421$ ($p = 0.666$)			
Texas Republicans			
Intercept	0.284	0.013	0.000
Post-1994	0.042	0.121	0.368
Time trend	0.004	0.002	0.021
Post-1994 × time trend	-0.002	0.010	0.430
$N = 15$, $R^2 = 0.699$, Chow test: $F_{2,11} = 0.640$ ($p = 0.546$)			
United States Democrats			
Intercept	48.898	0.412	0.000
Post-1994	-1.098	3.959	0.392
Time trend	-0.292	0.017	0.000
Post-1994 × time trend	0.023	0.080	0.386
$N = 57$, $R^2 = 0.934$, Chow test: $F_{2,53} = 0.045$ ($p = 0.956$)			
United States Republicans			
Intercept	27.724	0.957	0.000
Post-1994	6.052	9.182	0.256
Time trend	-0.085	0.039	0.017
Post-1994 × time trend	-0.040	0.186	0.415
$N = 57$, $R^2 = 0.137$, Chow test: $F_{2,53} = 4.192$ ($p = 0.020$)			

References

Adams, Greg D. 1997. "Abortion: Evidence of Issue Evolution." *American Journal of Political Science* 41:718–737.

Alvarez, R. Michael and Tara L. Butterfield. 2000. "The Resurgence of Nativism in California? The Case of Proposition 187 and Illegal Immigration." *Social Science Quarterly* 81:167–180.

Associated Press. 1991. "Immigrants Protest Veto on English Classes." *New York Times*, 11 November 1991. 6 August 2009, lexisnexis.com.

Barone, Michael. 2001. *The New Americans: How the Melting Pot Can Work Again.* Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing.

Bowler, Shaun, Stephen P. Nicholson and Gary M. Segura. 2006. "Earthquakes and Aftershocks: Race, Direct Democracy, and Partisan Change." *American Journal of Political Science* 50:146–159.

Box, G.E.P. and G.C. Tiao. 1975. "Intervention Analysis with Applications to Economic and Environmental Problems." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 70:70–79.

Brandt, Patrick T. and John R. Freeman. 2009. "Modeling Macro-Political Dynamics." *Political Analysis* 17(2):113–142.

Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter.* New York: Wiley.

Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson. 1989. *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Chow, Gregory C. 1960. "Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions." *Econometrica* 28:591–605.

Diamond, Sara. 1996. "Right-Wing Politics and the Anti-Immigration Cause." *Social Justice* 23(3):154–168.

Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. MacKuen and James A. Stimson. 1998. "What Moves Macropartisanship? A Reply to Green, Palmquist, and Schickler." *American Political Science Review* 92:901–912.

Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. MacKuen and James A. Stimson. 2002. *The Macro Polity.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist and Eric Schickler. 1998. "Macropartisanship: A Replication and Critique." *American Political Science Review* 92:437–466.

Greene, William H. 2003. *Econometric Analysis.* 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Hamburger, Tom and Peter Wallsten. 2006. *One Party Country: The Republican Plan for Dominance in the 21st Century.* Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Key, V.O. Jr. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation.* New York: A. Knopf.

Khaligh, Asslan. 2002. Republican Party's Dominance in Texas and the Hispanic Vote. In *Texas Politics Today*, by William Earl Maxwell, Ernest Crain, Edwin S. Davis, Elizabeth N. Flores, Joseph Ignani, Cynthia Opheim and Christopher Wlezien. 10th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Korey, John L. and Edward L. Lascher, Jr. 2006. "Macropartisanship in California." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 70:48–65.

Koyck, Leendert Marinus. 1954. *Distributed Lags and Investment Analysis*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson and James A. Stimson. 1989. "Macropartisanship." *American Political Science Review* 83:1125–1142.

Newton, Lina Y. 2000. "Why Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187: Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypotheses." *Social Science Quarterly* 81:180–193.

Newton, Lina Y. 2008. *Illegal, Alien, or Immigrant: The Politics of Immigration Reform*. New York: New York University Press.

Nicholson, Stephen P. 2005. *Voting the Agenda: Candidates, Elections, and Ballot Propositions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Peirce, Neal R. and Jerry Hagstrom. 1984. *The Book of America: Inside 50 States Today*. New York: Warner Books.

R Development Core Team. 2010. *R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing*. Vienna, Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing.

Reinhold, Robert. 1991. "In California, New Talk of Limits on Immigrants." *New York Times*, 3 December 1991. 6 August 2009, lexisnexis.com.

Sanchez, Leslie. 2007. *Los Republicanos*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stimson, James A. 1991. *Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.

Sundquist, James L. 1983. *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States*. Revised ed. Washington,: The Brookings Institution.

Weintraub, Daniel M. 1993. "Immigrant Services: Will the Feds Pay Up? (Governors Seek Federal Reimbursement of Immigrant Services Costs)." *State Legislatures*, April 1993. 29 July 2007, gale.cengage.com/AcademicOneFile/.

Whalen, Bill. 2002. "The GOP's California Blues." *Policy Review* No. 111:71–80.

Wolbrecht, Christina. 2000. *The Politics of Women's Rights: Parties, Positions, and Change.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wroe, Andrew. 2008. *The Republican Party and Immigration Politics: From Proposition 187 to George W. Bush.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.