

## **Polarization in Roll Call Voting among Women State Legislators**

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**Abstract:** In early work on women in Congress, scholars consistently identified a tendency among women legislators to be more liberal roll call voters than their male co-partisans. Recently, however, changes in Congress point to the polarization of women members (especially in the House), where Democratic women remain more liberal than Democratic men but Republican women are no different from, or even more conservative than, Republican men. Because this trend coincides with increased polarization and party strength generally in the House as well as the increased presence of more conservative women legislators, it is hard to determine what exactly the cause of this polarization is and the degree to which it exists among women in the state legislatures. In this paper, we examine women legislators' roll call voting in most of the 99 state legislative chambers in 1999-2000 to understand the degree of polarization among women state legislators and the possible causes of this polarization. We find some evidence that Democratic women are more liberal than Democratic men, although this trend is not ubiquitous in the state chambers. Republican women, however, are neither more liberal nor more conservative than Republican men in most cases.

In a well-known early paper on women in the House of Representatives, Welch (1985) found women legislators were more liberal roll call voters than the men in their respective parties. Because the feminist position on many women's issues policies coincides with the liberal end of the political spectrum, this tendency among women legislators to be liberal voters was taken as evidence that women of both parties might be more likely to substantively represent women's issues in Congress. Though one could certainly question the connection between broad liberal-conservative voting patterns and support for women's issues in a number of ways, studies of women's voting patterns using other more specific measures of women's issues also revealed a tendency for women in Congress to support women's issues across party lines, reinforcing the idea that the trend of liberalism in women's voting is a sign of women legislators representation of women.

Recent work on women in the House of Representatives, however, has noted a "polarization" between Republican and Democratic women, where Democratic women remain more liberal than Democratic men while Republican women appear more similar to, or even more conservative than, Republican men. Again, though broad trends can be misleading relative to more specific measures of support for women's issues policies among women legislators, this pattern of increased conservatism matches observations by other researchers of women and politics that Republican women are becoming increasingly ideologically conservative, and that these changes may have implications for the representation of women's issues by women in different parties. Though this trend has been observed in the House, we know less about whether it exists among women in the U.S. state legislatures, however.

To remedy this, in this project we consider whether the trend of liberalism for women in both parties or the trend of polarization better describes the broad patterns of women's voting behavior in most of the 99 U.S. state legislative chambers using 1999-2000 roll call data from the Representation in America's Legislatures Project. Additionally, given these patterns, we try to explain whether they are a result of women themselves, the types of districts women represent, or the effects that parties have on the legislative roll call voting process. We find, somewhat in contrast to the U.S. House, that Democratic and Republican women in many state legislative chambers do not look any different than their male counterparts. In chambers where they do differ, liberalism, not polarization, is the trend, particularly among Democratic women. Where women are significantly different voters in either party, it appears attributable to both the more liberal nature of the districts they represent and Democratic women themselves, rather than to institutional party strength.

### **Previous Work: Patterns in Women's Roll Call Voting**

Over time, many researchers have examined the roll call behavior of women legislators in an effort to understand the degree to which women legislators represent women's issues. In Congress, several studies use the extent to which women are more liberal voters as a proxy measure to understand women's representation and the possible relationship between more liberal voting and support for feminist issue positions. For example, Welch (1985) finds women legislators in both parties over four sessions of Congress are more liberal roll call voters compared to the men in their parties. She finds much of this liberalism is due to women legislators' representation of more liberal districts,

and once she controls for this effect, some differences such as those between northern male and female Democrats disappear. Her conclusions are similar to other early studies, such as Frankovic (1977), who found an independent effect of legislator sex on voting outside of the expected party influences, though she also noted women tended to represent more liberal districts.

Using a variety of different measures and House sessions across time, several other researchers corroborate the existence of gendered patterns in women's voting in Congress. For example, using a scale of votes on issues identified by the Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues, Dolan (1997) finds women of both parties were more willing to support these issues important to the legislative caucus. Democratic women generally were more likely to support these issues, but she also concludes Republican women were much more likely than Republican men to vote in support of the Caucus position. Similarly, using a subset of issues in the 101<sup>st</sup>, 102<sup>nd</sup> and 103<sup>rd</sup> congresses, Norton (1999) identifies a secondary gender dimension in many common interest group scales of roll call votes beyond the typical liberal-conservative dimension identified in most congressional voting patterns. In an analysis using the same CQ conservative coalition scores as Welch (1985) on later House sessions, Vega and Firestone (1995) find fewer differences between partisan women and men than Welch did, although they still find Republican women are more liberal roll call voters than Republican men. Finally, using more specific measures of support for women's issues in the 103<sup>rd</sup> Congress, Swers (1998; 2002) confirms women are different voters, in that there is a significant gender dimension for women in voting on women's issues and women are also more likely than men to support a feminist position in voting on individual women's issues policies, such as women's health bills, controlling for

party and constituency. Swers (1998) notes that this dimension exists in the 103<sup>rd</sup> Congress even though women may not appear to be more liberal than their male co-partisans in their overall voting records.

Despite the vast variety of measures used to assess women's voting in the studies described above, consensus exists among scholars of women in Congress that women are different voters than men, often in a way that reflects a tendency to be more liberal roll call voters compared to their co-partisans. Recent work on women in Congress is reevaluating this conclusion, however. Frederick (2009) finds women legislators in the House, rather than both being more liberal voters compared to their co-partisans, have polarized in recent congresses, beginning in the 108<sup>th</sup> Congress (2003-4). In his multivariate analysis, gender exerts a significant impact on the liberalism of one's Nominate score across congresses, but the substantive impact of this significance has lessened over time, leading men and women in each party to look much more similar to each other over time and erasing much of the liberalism among Republican women compared to Republican men (see also Evans 2005). This trend is bolstered by others who observe the election of more conservative women to Congress from the Republican party and evidence of dispute on women's issues between Democratic and Republican women in the House and in American politics more generally (e.g. Dodson 2006; Swers and Larsen 2005; Carroll 2002; Schreiber 2008).<sup>1</sup> This trend also occurs as the House itself has polarized since the Republican takeover in 1994 (Poole and Rosenthal 2007). To explain these changes in voting trends, Frederick (2009) and others who observe these trends note both that women represent more conservative districts than they used to and that the more intensely polarized House

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<sup>1</sup> Interestingly, Frederick (2010) does not find this polarizing relationship in the Senate.

of Representatives may create increasing pressure for women to behave as partisans regarding women's issues (see Swers 2002; Dodson 2006).

Though this changing relationship between gender and roll call voting in the House is itself interesting because of the implications it has for the representation of women's issues, it is also puzzling given the much less consistent research on women's voting behavior in the state legislatures. Generally, state legislative research, looking across a diverse set of chambers at different time periods, reaches two conclusions regarding women's voting. First, several studies simply find no difference in men and women's voting behavior in either party, using a variety of measures. For example, Barnello (1999), who examined the New York Assembly in 1993, found women did not vote for women's issues more often. Looking at the Arizona and California houses in 1993, Reingold (2000) comes to a similar conclusion. She finds occasional evidence of more liberal voting or voting across party lines among women on different women's issues, but she argues these occurrences are few and far between, and the more common pattern is for women to vote as partisans. Osborn (2012) also concludes there are few differences in voting on women's issues between women and men, in that the votes on women's issues policies in 23 chambers were either unanimously or near-unanimously passed by the chamber or women legislators voted for or against these policies along party lines. Second, a few studies conclude Republican women in some state legislatures are actually more conservative than men in their own party. Reingold (2000) observes that on several votes in California Republican women were actually more conservative on women's issues votes. Thomas (1989) also finds this on some votes in California Assembly (although she finds Republican women were more likely than Republican men to support some issues identified by

California NOW as key to women's interests). Finally, in the most complete treatment of the subject recently, Hogan (2008) finds that Democratic women are more liberal voters than Democratic men, but Republican women legislators in 28 lower state houses are more conservative voters than Republican men on National Federation of Independent Business interest group scores.

This contrast between the House of Representatives and the states – that in the House the consistently more liberal voting behavior of congressional women might be changing to polarization over time, while in the states patterns in women's voting behavior often find conservatism or no differences at all – begs a reexamination of what might lead women to be more liberal or conservative roll call voters in the states. Aside from party differences in voting, which clearly exist in most of these studies (in that partisan women act more like the men in their own party than each other on most roll call votes), one clear factor that may explain whether women are more liberal roll call voters is the degree to which women represent liberal or conservative districts. A second explanation, however, may be the effect party strength has on women's voting behavior. The changes observed by scholars concerning Republican women in the House of Representatives have occurred at a time when the parties have polarized institutionally, placing more intense pressure on women legislators to tow the party line (Frederick 2009; Swers and Larsen 2005). In the states, however, party strength varies substantially, from chambers with parties stronger than those of the modern House to chambers with little to no party structure to roll call voting (Wright, Osborn and Winburn 2004; Wright and Schaffner 2002). A third explanation may simply be that the independent effect of gender causes women to be more

liberal voters, outside of the effects of district ideology or partisanship inside the institution.

Therefore, in this paper, we examine two questions to understand women's voting patterns in the state legislatures. First, we try to understand whether women legislators are in fact more liberal or conservative roll call voters across the state chambers compared to their co-partisans, using Nominat scores derived from a set of roll call votes in the 1999-2000 sessions of the 50 lower state houses.<sup>2</sup> Second, we try to understand the degree to which district liberalness and party strength explain whether women legislators differ from their male co-partisans in roll call voting in most of the 99 state legislative chambers.

## **Data and Methods**

To examine these questions, we use an original data set consisting of all the competitive roll call votes taken in the 99 U.S. state legislative chambers during the 1999-2000 session. These data were collected by the Representation in America's Legislatures Project at Indiana University.<sup>3</sup> We define a competitive vote as any vote where at least 5 percent of the chamber voted in the minority. All together, this amounts to about 3.5 million roll call votes, although the number of roll calls taken in a session varies substantially by chamber. These votes include both procedural and substantive decisions.

In order to understand whether women are more liberal roll call voters or more polarized roll call voters than their male co-partisans and why, we use three measures derived from these roll call votes. The first measure at the individual level is a w-Nominate

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<sup>2</sup> We treat the Nebraska unicameral legislature as a lower house to include it as an observation in the analysis, even though they typically call it a Senate.

<sup>3</sup> Raw data are available at <http://www.indiana.edu/~ral>.



score for each legislator in the data set (see Poole and Rosenthal 1997). These scores are the same as the familiar scores used by many congressional scholars, with one pertinent exception. With congressional scores, the temporal variation of dw-Nominate allows comparison across congresses because they are on a common ideological scale. The scores we use in the first part of this analysis, however, cannot be compared across chamber because they lack this common ideological scale. That is, a score of .5 in the Michigan House does not indicate the same measure of a legislator's voting as a .5 in the Nevada House (although see below for the description of a common space measure). The advantage of using the scores for individual chambers in the first part of this analysis is that it allows us to assess women's ideology relative to their co-partisans in specific chambers.

In the first measure, we consider legislators' individual Nominate scores by chamber. In the first part of the analysis, the dependent variable is each individual legislator's first dimension Nominate score.<sup>4</sup> We adjust these scores to range from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 2, rather than the typical -1 to 1, to make interpretation of the coefficients in the model simpler. We also separate the sample into Democratic and Republican legislators to facilitate viewing the effects of gender by party. In this part of the analysis, we use only the lower houses of each legislature. This is because the small size of most of the upper chambers, especially once we split the sample by party, leaves very small numbers of legislators to analyze.

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<sup>4</sup> The major cleavage in most state chambers is a clear liberal-conservative first dimension (see Wright, Osborn and Winburn n.d.), similar to what Poole and Rosenthal (1997) find in Congress outside of key Civil Rights arguments. Though a few chambers have a significant second dimension, in additional analyses, none of these is a significant gender dimension.

Splitting the sample by party leaves some small numbers of legislators to analyze in small lower chambers (such as Alaska, Delaware, or Nevada), and therefore we use a very simple model to understand the effect of gender on Nominate scores. The key independent variable in this first part of the analysis is the sex of the legislator (1=woman). We control for two additional common determinants of legislators' voting behavior. First, we use the percentage of the state legislative district that voted for Gore in the 2000 election to account for the liberalness of the legislator's district.<sup>5</sup> As discussed in the section above, that women tend to represent more liberal districts is one of the central competing explanations for why women are more liberal roll call voters. Second, we use the percentage of African American voters in the state legislative district to control for whether legislators who represent African American districts are more liberal voters. This control accounts for whether race rather than gender (or in addition to gender) contributes to a more liberal voting record.

For the second part of the analysis, we focus on the differences between men and women legislators by party at the chamber level in order to understand what partisan characteristics at the aggregate level might explain why women are more liberal voters in some states and not others. The dependent variable in this portion is the difference between the mean Nominate score for women (by party) minus the mean score for men (by party), divided by the chamber standard deviation. The main independent variables account for party and district differences by chamber. First, we use three party measures to examine whether chambers with different party configurations limit or contribute to the liberal nature of women's voting. To measure party strength, we use a conditional party

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<sup>5</sup> This measure comes from aggregating precinct level presidential election returns to the state legislative district level.

government measure, the median Democrat score-median Republican score/chamber standard error (see Battista 2009) and a second simple measure of the R-squared from a regression of party on the Nominat scores per chamber (e.g., the proportion of the score on the first dimension accounted for by party id).<sup>6</sup> We also include a dummy variable for chamber control (1=Democrat control). Second, to measure district differences, we use the difference between the mean Gore vote in women's districts (by party) and men's districts (by party). Finally, we use measures of state party liberalism from Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993) to account for whether women are more liberal voters because they live in states with more liberal policies. We divide this analysis by party as well, in that we analyze the difference between Democratic men and women and Republican men and women in different models. This analysis considers both upper and lower legislative chambers.

Finally, to overcome the limits of the chamber-specific w-Nominat scores in the first portion of the analysis, we also consider women legislators' liberalism or polarization overall, across the state chambers, using a set of common ideological space scores derived from the 1999-2000 roll call votes.<sup>7</sup> These scores were created using Project Vote Smart scores from 1996-2005 as "bridges" across the chambers, where the bridge is created by aligning the mean and standard deviation of a combined PVS measure (for those who answered the PVS) with the mean and standard deviation of a combined Nominat score weighing the first two dimensions against presidential vote in the district (Rigby and Wright n.d.). The method of calculating these scores differs from the regression approach

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<sup>6</sup> Jim Battista provided both of these measures, see Battista (2009).

<sup>7</sup> Jerry Wright and Elizabeth Rigby provided these scores. For information on their calculation, please see Rigby and Wright (n.d.).

of Shor, Berry and McCarty (2010), and the scores should be treated as works in progress. The advantage of using individual level common space scores is that it allows us to assess women's voting liberalism without treating women as an aggregated group, thereby losing the variation among women within the same chamber and party and overcoming the problem of small-n sizes in the chamber-specific analysis. In this analysis, we still split the same by party to facilitate our discussion. We then assess whether individual women legislators (in each party) in the states are more liberal or more conservative than their male co-partisans, while accounting for the districts they represent and the institutional party characteristics of their chambers described above.

## **Analysis**

For the first portion of the analysis, we consider a simple question: are women legislators in the states more liberal voters than their male partisan counterparts, or are they more polarized than their male partisan counterparts? Tables 1 and 2 display the results of this analysis for Democratic and Republican legislators respectively. As a reminder, the dependent variable in this analysis is the first dimension w-Nominate score for each legislator. Each table gives the sign and significance of the OLS coefficients for the key independent variables, legislator sex and the liberalness of the district, for the regression in each lower legislative chamber (including the Nebraska unicameral legislature).

[Tables 1 and 2 here]

In Table 1, the results for Democratic legislators, it is clear women are significantly more liberal voters in several chambers, even while accounting for the liberalness of the

district and the percent of African American voters in the district. In 15 of the 50 chambers, Democratic women have significantly higher (which is more liberal) w-Nominate scores than Democratic men. However, this means in the other 35 chambers, Democratic women are not significantly different voters from Democratic men; that is, it is more common to see insignificant differences between Democratic men and women.

The results in Table 2 indicate it is even less common for Republican women to be more liberal voters than Republican men. In only 5 of the 50 chambers – Iowa, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Ohio – do Republican women have more liberal Nominate scores. In one chamber, Oklahoma, Republican women legislators are significantly more conservative voters than Republican men. In the other 44 chambers, however, Republican men and women have similar Nominate scores.

Taken as a whole, the results of Tables 1 and 2 are perhaps not surprising given the null effects of gender in some previous studies of roll call voting in state legislatures. Clearly, within the state legislative chambers the most common outcome is to see no significant difference in roll call voting, at least using this summary measure, between women and men legislators in either party. Between Democrats it is slightly more common to see a significant difference than between Republicans, but this still only occurs within 15 of the 50 chambers in the analysis.

So what explains the presence of more liberal women in some state legislative chambers and not others? In the second part of the analysis, we draw on explanations from the congressional studies discussed above to try to understand when these significant gender gaps occur. Particularly, there are three possible reasons these gaps might emerge. First, strong institutional parties, such as those in the modern House of Representatives,

may influence the degree to which women legislators in either party, if they are more liberal ideologically, are able to defect from the party line enough to become significantly different voters. We measure party strength in two different ways to capture both the ideological distance between the parties and the degree to which a legislator's party identification explains variation in his or her roll call behavior. The second possibility we explore is whether women's presence in a more liberal environment makes them appear to be more liberal voters. We account for a liberal environment in two ways: first, we measure the mean difference in district liberalism between men and women in the same party; second, we account for whether women are more liberal voters in more liberal policy states. Finally, if neither institutional parties nor district and/or state liberalism explains why women are more liberal voters in some states and not others, then we may conclude that gender exhibits an independent and liberal effect on women's voting in some state chambers, apart from district or party influences.

[Table 3 here]

Table 3 presents the OLS results of this analysis, using the difference in mean w-Nominate score between women and men in each party divided by the chamber standard deviation as the dependent variable. For the difference between Democratic women and men (the left hand column), the only variable that significantly explains this difference is a larger gap in the mean liberalness of men's and women's districts. If Democratic women legislators represent more liberal districts on average, then they are more liberal roll call voters, too. The same significant difference exists for Republicans (right hand column). If Republican women represent more liberal districts on average than Republican men, they too are more liberal roll call voters. For both analyses, neither party strength and control

nor state ideology significantly explain the gender gap between either Democratic or Republican women and men. The small R-squared for each model also suggests there may be other explanations for these gaps in the states not accounted for in these models.

To try a more precise measure of women's liberalness in roll call voting in different district and institutional circumstances, our third analysis considers individual Democratic and Republican women's voting overall, accounting for chamber and district characteristics. The dependent variable in this analysis (again, with split samples of Democrats and Republicans) is the common ideological space score described above. This score runs from near 0 (very conservative) to 4.571 (very liberal). We control for institutional parties using the same measures of party distance, strength, and control from Table 3. We also account for the liberalness of a legislator's district using the same measure of Democratic presidential vote from above. To account for the liberalness of the state, we use Erikson, Wright and McIver's state policy scores. Finally, to measure the joint effect of women who represent liberal districts, we use an interaction term.<sup>8</sup> Table 4 summarizes the results of this analysis.

[Table 4 here]

The most striking result of the analyses in Table 4 is that for Democrats, being a woman makes one significantly more liberal, but for Republicans, women are not significantly different voters from men. The coefficient for women in the Democratic sample is both large and highly significant. This is the case even when controlling for the

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<sup>8</sup> We also tried several additional controls to account for alternative explanations. First, we included measures for the % African American in district, whether the legislator was African American, and whether the legislator was an African American woman. Surprisingly, none of these variables reached significance in any model. Second, we tried an interaction between strong party chambers and Democratic majorities, which was also insignificant.

liberalness of the district, suggesting there is an independent effect for gender among Democrats beyond the propensity of women to represent more liberal districts. Interestingly, strong parties lead to more liberal scores for both Democrats and Republicans, yet this control does not limit the independent effect of gender.

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

Though a work in progress, the analysis above contributes to our knowledge about women in legislatures in several ways. First, this is (at least to our knowledge) the first analysis that considers women's voting behavior across almost all the U.S. state legislative chambers. From this, it is interesting to compare whether either of the relationships in women's voting behavior common in the U.S. House exist in the state legislative chambers. We find some evidence that Democratic women are more liberal roll call voters. In the chamber-specific analysis, Democratic women more liberal than Democratic men in 15 lower chambers, and in the individual-level analysis Democratic women are more liberal roll call voters across the state chambers, even controlling for state characteristics. Republican women, however, are not more liberal voters than Republican men: in only 5 of the lower chambers does this difference exist between Republican women and men. Similarly, in only one lower chamber, Oklahoma, are women Republicans significantly more conservative than their male co-partisans, as at least one researcher has contended is the case in the current, polarized U.S. House (Frederick 2009).

The second contribution to our knowledge about women's voting is perhaps less definite, but still interesting. Among Democrats, women's liberalism appears in part driven by gender specifically, but also by the fact that they represent more liberal districts



on average than men in many states. In a chamber-level analysis, the average gap between both Democratic women and men or Republican women and men is significantly bigger (in that women in both parties are more liberal voters) when women, on average, represent more liberal districts. In the chamber-level analysis, however, none of the institutional variables or the state ideology differences among the states explains the size of these gaps. In the U.S. House of Representatives, strong parties and party control both exert pressure on women representatives, particularly Republican women, who might otherwise support more liberal measures (e.g. Swers 2002; Dodson 2006). However, strong parties here do not lessen the size of the difference in average voting score between women and men in either party. This is not to say institutional partisan strength and control do not have effects on women's behavior; in the individual-level analysis using common space scores party strength contributed to voting liberalism in both parties. However, women Democrats were still more liberal than male Republicans, even after accounting for district and party effects. Some work remains to reconcile the chamber and individual level results in Tables 3-4.

Third, and more theoretically, it is important to consider substantively what these results mean for the ways in which women legislators behave and what these behaviors indicate about the representation of women's issues. Measuring liberal voting patterns among women is at best a rough proxy for behavior indicating the representation of women's issues in any legislature. Changes in these aggregate voting patterns in Congress, however, may be indicative of the election of a different type of woman to legislative office and perhaps a lesser inclination to work across party lines on women's issues (e.g. see Dodson 2006). Though liberal voting patterns among women state legislators have been

less consistent across different studies, we also lack the extent of analysis in the states that we have in Congress. Therefore, it is harder to say if the patterns in this analysis indicate changes in the types of women elected, especially with the 1999-2000 cross section we consider here. It could be gaps between women and men in the states have lessened over time like in Congress, especially among Republican women, but we would need time series data to understand this in the states.

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**Table 1. Gender, Party and Constituency Effects on Nominate, Democratic Legislators**

Chamber	Sex	Dem District	N	Chamber	Sex	Dem District	N
AKH	+	-	14	MTH	+*	+	41
ALH	+	+	68	NCH	+	+*	69
ARH	+	+*	69	NDH	+	+	34
AZH	+	-	20	NEU	+**	+*	20
CAH	+	+***	47	NHH	+**	+	147
COH	-	+	25	NJH	+	+	36
CTH	+	+*	96	NMH	+	+***	40
DEH	+	+	15	NVH	+	+	28
FLH	+	+***	48	NYH	+	+***	96
GAH	+	+***	104	OHH	+	+	42
HIH	+	+	38	OKH	-	+	61
IAH	+	+	46	ORH	+**	+***	25
IDH	+*	+**	13	PAH	+*	+	101
ILH	+	+***	63	RIH	-	-	89
INH	+	+*	53	SCH	+	+**	59
KSH	+	+	48	SDH	+	+	19
KYH	+**	+*	65	TNH	+	+	59
LAH	+	+***	83	TXH	+**	+***	77
MAH	+***	+***	134	UTH	+	+**	21
MDH	+*	+***	107	VAH	+	+***	53
MEH	+*	+***	79	VTH	+***	+	79
MIH	+	+**	52	WAH	+	+***	49
MNH	+*	+***	64	WIH	+	+***	45
MOH	+**	+**	90	WVH	+	-	77
MSH	+	+***	101	WYH	+*	+***	19

Note: Entries demonstrate the sign and significance of OLS coefficients. The model that produced these estimates included a control variable for the % black in district (not shown). \*\*\*p<.001; \*\*p<.01; \*p<.05

**Table 2. Gender, Party and Constituency Effects on Nominate, Republican Legislators**

Chamber	Sex	Dem District	N	Chamber	Sex	Dem District	N
AKH	+	+	26	MTH	-	+	58
ALH	-	+	37	NCH	+	+	55
ARH	+	+	30	NDH	-	+	64
AZH	-	+	40	NEU	+	+	29
CAH	+	+	32	NHH	+	+	242
COH	+	-	41	NJH	-	+	48
CTH	-	+	55	NMH	+	+	30
DEH	-	+	26	NVH	+	+	14
FLH	-	+	77	NYH	-	+	52
GAH	+	+	75	OHH	+	-	65
HIH	+	+	13	OKH	-	+	40
IAH	+	+	57	ORH	-	+	35
IDH	+	+	61	PAH	-	+	101
ILH	-	+	56	RIH	+	+	13
INH	+	+	48	SCH	+	+	67
KSH	-	+	79	SDH	-	+	52
KYH	+	+	35	TNH	+	+	40
LAH	+	+	36	TXH	-	+	72
MAH	+	-	27	UTH	+	+	54
MDH	-	+	35	VAH	+	+	54
MEH	+	+	70	VTH	-	+	64
MIH	+	+	58	WAH	+	+	50
MNH	+	+	71	WIH	+	+	54
MOH	+	+	77	WVH	+	+	26
MSH	+	+	41	WYH	-	+	44

Note: Entries demonstrate the sign and significance of OLS coefficients. The model that produced these estimates included a control variable for the % black in district (not shown). \*\*\*p<.001; \*\*p<.01; \*p<.05

**Table 3. Determinants of Sex Differences by Party, OLS Estimates**

Ind. Variables	Dem Difference	Rep Difference
Avg. District Diff	***0.012 (0.003)	*0.019 (0.009)
State Ideology	0.027 (0.222)	0.005 (0.035)
Party Median Diff	-0.037 (0.110)	0.135 (0.183)
Party RSQ	-0.163 (0.152)	-0.428 (0.249)
Dem Majority	0.007 (0.043)	0.073 (0.069)
Constant	0.269 (0.150)	0.104 (0.251)
N	93	92
R squared	0.18	0.11

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients. Dependent variable, by party, is (mean Democratic/Republican women-mean Democratic/Republican men)/chamber standard error. Units of analysis are state legislative chambers. Some chambers are omitted because of missing information or nonpartisan status.

\*\*\*p<.001; \*\*p<.01; \*p<.05

**Table 4. Determinants of Sex Differences by Party, OLS Estimates of Common Space Scores**

Ind. Variables	Democrats	Republicans
Woman	***0.445 (0.060)	-0.058 (0.103)
Dem District	***0.018 (0.002)	***0.019 (0.002)
Woman*District	***-0.004 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)
Party Median Diff	-0.094 (0.083)	-0.089 (0.141)
Party Strength	***0.550 (0.147)	***-0.735 (0.201)
Dem Majority	** -0.125 (0.040)	** -0.157 (0.060)
State Ideology	**0.063 (0.022)	*0.072 (0.037)
Constant	***1.975 (0.118)	***1.667 (0.177)
N	3770	3466
R-squared	0.42	0.23

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors clustered by chamber. Dependent variable is the common space measure of voting ideology from the 1999-2000 roll call data. DV min=0, DV max=4.571.