

## **The Effects of Statehouse Endorsements on Opinions toward Referendums**

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### **Abstract:**

While Congress sets the standard for legislative disapproval, statehouses are not far behind. What are the consequences of low approval ratings for state legislative institutions that seek voter consent on statewide referendums? In light of existing scholarly support for the role of elite cues in shaping voter attitudes, we expect that individuals will view a state legislature's endorsement of a referendum negatively. Using three survey experiments that cover five Arkansas referendums from 2000-2010, we test the hypothesis that providing individuals with an endorsement from the state legislature will lead to lower support for a referendum when compared to individuals who did not receive the endorsement. Contrary to our expectations, we find that providing a legislative endorsement has no statistically significant effect on referendum approval; in fact, the influence of endorsement is modestly positive in most cases. Our results suggest that the effect of elite endorsements on opinion formation is more complicated than that suggested by existing literature. Our findings also challenge the notion that individuals love their representative but dislike the legislature.

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## **Introduction**

Legislative institutions long have suffered from markedly low levels of public approval (Squire 1993). Although it is Congress's record-setting lows which have made headlines of late, most statehouses fare only marginally better. As Richardson, Konisky, and Milyo report "state legislatures are held in low regard across the country" (2012, p. 100). Data from the 2007 and 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study revealed that a majority of residents approved of state legislative performance in only five states (Alaska, Idaho, North Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming). The average approval rating across all states on a five-point scale was just 2.68, with only a third of the sample providing an "approve" or "strongly approve" response.<sup>1</sup>

Scholars have examined both the causes and consequences of low levels of public approval for state legislative institutions. One potential ramification that political scientists have overlooked is how a state legislature's low approval rating affects the referendums that the members of these institutions often ask the public to consider at the ballot box. If we assume that most voters possess little information about such measures and are therefore likely to rely on available shortcuts, we expect that the express endorsement of a referendum by an unpopular institution will result in decreased support for that measure. We investigate this relationship using survey experiments that cover five Arkansas referendums in three elections between 2000-2010. Contrary to our expectations, we find that a legislative endorsement has no statistically significant effect on referendum approval; instead, in most cases, the effect of endorsement is mildly positive. This pattern is remarkable in light of the Arkansas General Assembly's low approval rating: 29 percent in March of 2011. Our work suggests that the influence of an elite

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<sup>1</sup> Governors fared slightly better, scoring an average of 3.03 on the same scale (see Richardson, Konisky, and Milyo 2012, Table A1).

endorsement on political behavior is more complicated than the existing literature reveals. Our results also challenge the long-held belief that individuals love their legislator but dislike the legislature.

### **State Legislative (Dis)Approval: Causes and Consequences**

The bulk of existing research on state legislative (dis)approval focuses on its individual-level determinants.<sup>2</sup> While seemingly simple in nature, the task has proved challenging as it requires the regular collection of multi-state public opinion data, the prospects of which remain dim (Parry, Kisida, and Langley 2008, Carsey and Harden 2010). Still, in the most thorough treatment to date, Richardson, Konisky, and Milyo (2012) identify and evaluate three factors likely to influence public affect toward state legislatures: institutional factors, ideological factors, and the potentially confounding effect of gubernatorial approval.

With respect to the influence of institutional characteristics, Squire (1993) demonstrates that greater professionalization has a negative effect on the public's evaluation of state legislative institutions (see also Jewell 1982, Patterson, Ripley and Quinlan 1992, Kelleher and Wolak 2007). Richardson, Konisky, and Milyo (2012), however, show that the direction of that relationship holds only for respondents who are self-identified conservatives (and, to a lesser extent, self-identified moderates). Once they control for ideological orientation, they find professionalization itself is unrelated to legislative approval. Similarly, and in sharp contrast to the findings of Kelleher and Wolak (2007), Richardson, Konisky, and Milyo argue that neither

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<sup>2</sup> For a thorough and contemporary examination of public confidence at the aggregate level, see Wolak and Palus (2010).

term limits nor direct democracy exerts an independent influence on the public's evaluation of state legislative bodies.<sup>3</sup>

Partisanship, however, influences legislative approval in predictable ways: partisans are more likely than independents to offer positive appraisals of statehouse performance, and both Democratic and Republican identifiers are more likely to approve of legislatures controlled by their respective "home teams" (see also Levi and Stoker 2000). Finally, Richardson, Konisky, and Milyo (2012) find that gubernatorial approval ratings play a positive and significant role on citizens' evaluations of their counterparts in the legislative branch, controlling for other factors.

The consequences the public's dismal view of their state's legislature have received less scholarly attention, however. An important exception is Karp's (1995) examination of the influence of legislative (dis)approval on support for "reigning in" state legislative institutions by adopting mechanisms such as term limits. Despite the conventional wisdom, he fails to find a significant effect for the public's evaluation of statehouse performance. Instead, generalized cynicism toward government and one's ability to influence its direction is the most powerful explanatory factor (see also Parry and Donovan 2005).

Finally, the decidedly negative nature of state legislative approval poses an interesting paradox: If voters are so upset with their state legislature, why do they continue to reelect their representatives at such a high rate (e.g., Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000, Jewell and Breaux 1988)? Fenno (1975) observes this perplexing outcome with Congress, noting that despite the decline in Congress's approval ratings, members of Congress do quite well running for reelection. He concludes that they win by running against the institution itself:

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<sup>3</sup> Using measures of trust, rather than approval, Smith and Tolbert (2004) confirm the findings of Bowler and Donovan (2002) that access to direct democracy has a positive effect on citizen affect.

“As a courtship technique... they re-enforce our unfavorable judgments about the institution. Every representative with whom I traveled criticized the Congress and portrayed himself, by contrast, as a fighter against its manifest evils. Members run *for* Congress by running *against* Congress” (Fenno 1975, p. 280).

In this paradox, however, Fenno opines that most individuals may have a hard time separating the difference between their feelings toward their legislator and the legislature as a whole. Disentangling the two requires an understanding of the complexity of the institution, which most individuals lack. This implies that individuals’ assessment of their state’s legislature, while negative, may be more abstract than concrete. This is a question we can begin to examine with our experiment. If a legislative endorsement does not have the depressing effect on support for referendums as we predict, it implies that individuals’ opinions about their state’s legislature is complex, as Fenno suggests. Thus, similar to the paradox that negative evaluations do not lead to incumbents losing elections, perhaps negative evaluations of the legislature do not translate to defeat of the policies they propose to the public via the referendum.

### **State Legislative (Dis)Approval as a Cue in Referendum Voting**

We propose that an overlooked consequence of the low esteem in which citizens hold state legislative institutions is its potential impact on the referendums put forward by the members of those institutions. We believe the effect is likely to be substantial in light of how obscure and abstruse many referendums measures are. If it is well established that most voters know little about even high-profile political matters (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), they appear to know even less about ballot measures (Magleby 1984, Bowler and Donovan 1998, Lupia and Matsusaka 2004). Lower competency in the latter area is to be expected however: the

clues available in most candidate contests — partisanship, incumbency, and gender, for example — are absent in the case of the initiatives and referendums voters consider with some regularity in about half the states.

Still, existing scholarship suggests that attentive citizens not only express a strong interest in using elite cues to inform their voting (Bowler and Donovan 1994), but empirical evidence shows that voters can rely on elite endorsements to improve their decisions. As Lupia (1994) finds, even relatively uninformed individuals need only have knowledge of simple cues — in his case, interest group backing — to make decisions comparable to those made by voters who possess “encyclopedic” knowledge of a ballot measure. While the impact of such endorsements is conditional on whether the individual provided a positive or negative evaluation of the cue-giver (Karp 1998, Lupia and McCubbins 1998) as well as on the voter’s level of sophistication (Boudreau 2009, although see also Burnett, Garrett, and McCubbins 2010), the utility of elite cues receives strong support in the literature on opinion formation and direct democracy (see, for example, Zaller 1992, Lupia 1992, Karp 1995, Lupia and McCubbins 1998, Paul and Brown 2001, Bratton 2003, and Wells et al. 2009, although see also Lewkowicz 2006). Since most individuals lack specific knowledge of most ballot measures, any information — and cues especially — should have a noticeable impact on their decisions. Thus, a cue that individuals view negatively should lead to an increase in support if the cue-giver opposes the measure and a decrease in support if the cue-giver supports the measure. For state legislatures, which most individuals view negatively, an endorsement should reduce the level of support for the policies the legislature proposes.

## **Hypothesis, Research Design, and Data**

When a state legislature proposes a referendum to voters for approval, they are, in effect, endorsing that piece of legislation. But can they influence the public's approval of legislatively referred ballot measures? While the power of a legislative endorsement to influence voters is an untested empirical question, there is a strong theoretical expectation that a state legislature should be an influential cue-giver primarily because it satisfies both of the necessary conditions for a third party's endorsement to be persuasive — i.e., the third party is knowledgeable and trustworthy (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). In particular, a state legislature satisfies the knowledgeability condition because the legislature presumably has policy expertise. Second, a state legislature satisfies the trustworthy condition because many individuals share common interests with the legislature. Here, we argue that a state legislature can establish trust through its job performance. That is, if an individual has a positive view of her state's legislature, she will be more likely to accept and support policies that the legislature proposes via the referendum process. Conversely, if she holds a negative view of the state legislature, she is more likely to reject any referendum the legislature proposes. Indeed, Lewkowicz (2006) asserts the negative influence to be the stronger of the two.

In short, we focus on an unanswered question about legislative endorsements: Does an endorsement from a state legislature lead to a more positive or more negative assessment of a legislative referendum? Given the previous — albeit limited — research on legislative approval that shows most individuals disapprove of their state's legislature, our expectation is that voters will view a legislative endorsement negatively. As outlined above, because voters, on average, affix a negative job approval rating to the state legislature, we propose they will be predisposed to reject any proposed measure from the legislature.

**H1:** An endorsement from the state legislature will decrease the amount of public support for a referendum.

To test our hypothesis, we conducted survey experiments that asked residents of Arkansas whether they supported or opposed five legislative referendums in three separate elections. We assigned half the sample to a treatment group that — before indicating their support or opposition — heard a blurb about the measures indicating that Arkansas’s state legislature supported them. The control group, by contrast, heard an identical blurb without the legislative endorsement. Our hypothesis predicts that respondents in the treatment group — upon hearing the legislative endorsement — will be, on average, less likely to support the referendum when compared to the baseline approval of the control group.

We examine the effect of our treatment in two ways. First, we estimate the average treatment effect by calculating the difference in overall support for each of the five referendums. If our hypothesis is correct, the average treatment effect should show that support for the referendums among respondents in the treatment group will be lower when compared to the control group. Second, we run a simple logit regression to measure whether our treatment had an effect while holding constant other variables that are known predictors of political behavior. Specifically, we include two dichotomous measures of whether the respondent is a *Democrat* or *Republican*, a continuous measurement of *age*, and two categorical measures of *education* and *income*. We provide a description of the questions we used to measure these control variables in Appendix A.



Our survey experiments occurred during three separate elections in 2000, 2006, and 2010. The 2000 experiment asked respondents to consider three legislative referendums. The first referendum, Amendment 1, titled “The City and County Government Redevelopment Bond and Short Term Financing Act,” proposed to amend the Arkansas constitution to allow cities and counties to create redevelopment districts and issue short term bonds. The constitutional amendment passed with 54.6 percent of the vote. In advance of registering their support or opposition, the treatment group heard the following description:

Amendment 1 was referred to the voters by the Legislature. It allows city and county governments in Arkansas to form “redevelopment districts” in economically deteriorated areas in order to finance improvements in the area. The proposal also allows local governments to borrow money to pay for certain big-ticket items... like road-grading equipment, for example. Given this description, do you favor or oppose this issue?

The control group heard an identical description without the explicit reference to the endorsement by the state legislature.

Amendment 2, titled “Proposing a Constitutional Amendment to Provide Property Tax Relief,” was the second measure on the 2000 survey experiment. The constitutional referendum queried respondents about whether they supported limiting the potential increase in property taxes resulting from a countywide reappraisal for each homeowner. The measure also provided a \$300 tax cut on ad valorem property taxes. The measure passed with 62.1 percent of the vote.

Before indicating support or opposition, the treatment group received the following blurb:

Amendment 2 was also proposed by the Legislature. It relates to the property tax. It gives taxpayers a credit of up to \$300 toward their homestead property taxes. It also limits the amount that a person’s property tax could increase in a given year and prohibits a property tax increase on property owned by elderly or disabled persons. Finally, to offset the revenue that would be lost, the legislature would increase the state sales tax by 1/2 cent if this amendment passes. Given this description, do you favor or oppose this measure?

As above, the control group heard an identical description that omitted the statehouse's support for the measure.

Amendment 3, titled "Amendment to the Arkansas Constitution to Revise the Judicial Article," is the third measure from the 2000 experiment. The constitutional referendum proposed to alter the rules governing judicial elections, including trading the state's long-standing partisan judicial elections for non-partisan contests. The measure also proposed to reorganize much of the state's judicial structure. In keeping with the previous two amendments, Amendment 3 passed, garnering 57.1 percent of the vote. The treatment group heard the following description of the ballot measure before reporting their intention to support or oppose the measure:

Amendment 3, also proposed to us by the Legislature, would revise the part of the Arkansas Constitution that deals with our court system. Some of these changes include switching our current method of choosing judges from partisan elections - in which candidates run as Democrats or Republicans - to nonpartisan elections - in which party affiliations are not identified. The amendment also would merge our multiple trial-level courts into a single court. Given this description, do you favor or oppose this measure?

As before, the control group received the same description without the legislative endorsement.

Using random digit dialing, we collected responses for our first survey experiment from October 17-25, 2000. The final sample included 775 responses (the cooperation rate was 47 percent). Of the 775 responses, all but seven respondents completed enough of the survey to provide an opinion on all three measures. Of those 768 respondents, 368 were assigned to the control group and 400 to the treatment group. Using group assignment as the dependent variable and our control variables as independent variables, a logit regression (available from the authors) shows that the treatment group was slightly more Republicans than the control group. Since we control for partisanship in our regression analysis, however, this minor aberration is not worrisome.

For our second experiment, we asked respondents about only one measure in 2006: Amendment 1, titled the “Allow Bingo and Raffles by Charitable Organizations Act.” The legislatively referred constitutional amendment proposed to allow established non-profit groups (e.g., churches, educational organizations) to conduct bingos and raffles for fundraising purposes, thereby creating exemptions to the state’s explicit prohibition of lottery-style gambling. The measure passed with 68.9 percent of the voters casting ballots in the affirmative. Respondents in the control group received the following depiction of the measure before indicating whether they supported the proposal:

Referred Amendment 1 is proposed to us by the legislature. It would make bingo and raffles legal in Arkansas if conducted by established nonprofit organizations for charitable purposes. Given this description, do you favor or oppose this measure?

The control group heard an identical description, again without making note of the legislative endorsement.

We used random digit dialing to collect responses for the second experiment from October 8-17, 2006. We collected interviews from 771 Arkansas citizens (the cooperation rate was 38 percent). Of these respondents, 665 provided a response to the question regarding Amendment 1; 390 were assigned to the treatment group and 375 were assigned to the control group. We achieved excellent random assignment, as a logit regression (available from authors) shows that none of our control variables are significant predictors of group assignment.

The third and final experiment was conducted in 2010: it asked respondents about Amendment 1, or the “Arkansas Hunting Rights Constitutional Amendment.” The amendment proposed to protect the rights of Arkansas citizens to “hunt, fish, trap, and harvest wildlife” within the state. The amendment passed overwhelmingly, garnering 82.8 percent of the vote. The treatment group heard the following description of the measure:

Referred Amendment 1 is proposed to us by the state legislature. It would amend the Arkansas constitution to provide for a constitutional right to “hunt, fish, trap, and harvest wildlife, subject to regulations that promote wildlife preservation and management.” Given this description, do you favor or oppose this measure?

As with the previous four measures, the control group heard a version of the description which lacked the legislative endorsement.

For the 2010 experiment, we used random digit dialing to collect responses from October 8-20, 2010. We gathered responses from 771 Arkansas residents (the cooperation rate was 48%), of which 761 provided a response to the question that measured their opinion about Amendment 1. Of those 761 respondents, 387 were assigned to the treatment group and 374 to the control group. As above, our random assignment worked well, i.e., none of our control variables are significant predictors of group assignment (regression results available from the authors).

In addition to achieving strong random assignment, our surveys are also representative of Arkansas’s citizens, thus ensuring the generalizability of our results to at least one state. Random digit dialing achieved a sample of respondents that corresponds with Census data for the state. While our sample is somewhat older, we expected this discrepancy given that our respondents were at least 18 years of age. In the 2006 survey, the sample is slightly more female — though this difference is minor — and all three of our experiments gathered a more educated sample of above-average income, as is typical for political surveys and indeed useful for election-specific research. We provide an in-depth comparison of our sample to the relevant Census statistics in Appendix B.

## **Results**

We begin by estimating the average treatment effect in our experiments. The clearest way to present this effect is to calculate and compare the level of support, the level of opposition, and

the number of “don’t know” responses in both the treatment and control groups for each measure. Three interesting findings emerge and are presented in Table 1. First, the difference in support for each measure is affected only modestly by our treatments. These results are so slight, in fact, that only one of the five referendums we included in our experiments exhibits a statistically significant difference in responses (Amendment 2 of 2000).<sup>4</sup> Second, the results in Table 1, while not significant, tend to support a relationship opposite of what our hypothesis proposes, i.e., respondents, upon hearing a legislative endorsement, appear to be *more likely to support the referendum*. Indeed, in four out of the five referendums we tested, we find an increase in support for the measure when we compare the treatment group to the control group. This result is somewhat surprising given our expectation that a legislative endorsement should lead to less overall support among respondents. Third, the legislative endorsement seems to have had a small “clarifying effect” for some respondents. That is, respondents in three of the five treatment groups were less likely to register a “don’t know” response when compared to the relevant control group. Again, this finding is modest, but somewhat expected because a state legislature’s endorsement should satisfy both conditions necessary for persuasion. We offer a broader discussion of these findings in the next section.

**[Table 1 About Here]**

The second test of our hypothesis is a series of logit regressions. In these regressions, we omit the “don’t know” responses from the analysis for simplicity, and because a more sophisticated multinomial model produces substantively similar results. There are two findings

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<sup>4</sup> We calculated significance levels by running a series of unreported multinomial logit regressions. Of the five referendums, only Amendment 2 (2000) saw a significant amount of “don’t know” respondents in the treatment condition select either “approve” or “disapprove” compared to the control baseline.

worth noting from the regressions presented in Table 2 below. First, with the exception of 2010's Amendment 1, at least one of our covariates significantly explains some of the variation in support for the referendums. Partisan identification in particular is more likely than the other variables to be a significant predictor of support. Overall, however, the explanatory power of the model is weak. Second, we simply confirm the results presented in Table 1: Our treatment is not a significant predictor of support for the referendums. This result, coupled with the previous table, provides clear evidence that we cannot reject the null hypothesis.

**[Table 2 About Here]**

To make the interpretation of our regression results easier, we use *CLARIFY* for Stata (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000) to estimate the effect of the treatment. To calculate the probability of support for each measure, we set the partisan effects to the mean value and all other covariates to the median. As Table 3 shows, a legislative endorsement exerts a positive effect on support for the referendums of about 2 percentage points for three of the five referendums (Amendment 1 of 2000, Amendment 3 of 2000, and Amendment 1 of 2010). For the other two referendums, the effect is essentially zero. While these results are not significant and thus prevent us from rejecting the null hypothesis, we believe they suggest a more complicated relationship between elite cues and ballot measure voting than the existing literature reveals.

**[Table 3 About Here]**

## **Discussion**

The public holds statehouses, similar to the U.S. Congress, in low esteem. Although most of the research on the matter centers on its causes, Karp's (1995) exploration of its consequences

together with the discoveries of Lupia (1994) and others about the importance of elite cues in driving voter preferences on ballot measures, led us to expect that the express endorsement from the state legislature included in our survey experiments would have a significant and negative effect on individuals' support for statewide referendums when compared to individuals with whom we did not share the endorsement. Instead, we found a weakly positive influence, although the difference did not achieve statistical significance.

Our results have three important implications. The first implication is that the effect of elite endorsements on political behavior is more complicated than that suggested by existing literature. In particular, we deduced a clear prediction about how a state legislature's endorsement of a ballot measure would influence individuals' assessments of the proposal. We anticipated that individuals who learned of the legislature's support of a measure would use their negative assessment of the legislature to infer that they should not support the legislation. If someone disagrees with a cue-giver and the cue-giver recommends one action, the logical expectation is that she will do the opposite. We found no evidence that this occurred. Our data, in fact, suggested — if weakly — that the opposite was true.

Our experiment demonstrates that individuals were unaffected by the legislative endorsement. This is especially surprising given the strong belief in the literature that endorsements can cure the ills of an ignorant electorate. Moreover, there is no strong *ex ante* reason to expect that a legislative endorsement would not be persuasive: many voters will perceive the legislature to be knowledgeable and trustworthy. Still, the lack of change in opinion implies one or more of the following: (1) our treatment was too subtle, (2) a legislative endorsement is not persuasive, (3) individuals' use of cues is not as widespread as many scholars

believe, and (4) individuals' perception of their state's legislature is not as straightforward as we assumed. Further research is needed to assess the degree to which one or all are true.

The second implication of our results is that individuals' impressions of their state legislature are perhaps not well captured by simple opinion questions. Fenno notes this problem by asking why individuals seem to love their congressman but despise Congress. After all, if voters really disliked Congress, they should be unwilling to send their individual member back to Washington. But, they do, over 90 percent of the time in the case of the House of Representatives. Fenno notes that this paradox occurs because "The more we try to understand Congress...the more we are forced to peel back the institutional layers until we reach the individual member. At that point, it becomes hard to separate, as we normally do, our judgments about congressmen and Congress" (1975, p. 286).

The same problem may be true for state legislatures. Indeed, individuals may report that they dislike the body as a whole — as citizens in Arkansas did in 2011, affixing a 29 percent approval rating to the legislature — without much understanding of what it is they dislike. This lack of understanding and, by extension, a fungible opinion about the legislature may lead to seemingly irrational outcomes such as reelecting members at a high rate. It may also equate to no discernable difference in support for referendums when individuals know the legislature supports them, which is what we found. In other words, if individuals do not have a firm opinion about the legislature, then it is unlikely that a legislative endorsement will be persuasive. Testing this conjecture, however, requires additional data.

Similarly, the third implication is that individuals may actually have a more positive view of the state legislature than public opinion polls capture. If individuals have a complicated view of the state legislature (as we have suggested), then it seems that they actually hold the state



legislature in more esteem than standard survey questions reveal. Because we saw no statistically significant movement in support between our treatment and control conditions, our non-findings imply that individuals do not seem to dislike the legislature to the degree that many pundits would suggest. Perhaps individuals believe the state legislature will only propose legislation that is an improvement for most residents, especially in states that have the direct initiative (Boehmke and Patty 2007).<sup>5</sup> Evidence suggests that this might be true. Examining the 35 referendums that have appeared on Arkansas ballots since 1988, 26 passed (74% passage rate). This fact hints that individuals, despite their dislike for the institution, trust the legislature to propose welfare-improving policies. To assess this possibility, further data and analysis are required, including measures of whether individuals understand that a referendum is a proposal from the legislature. At the least, the results we present above indicate that both usage of cues and opinion about state legislatures is much more complicated than previously assumed.

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<sup>5</sup> While Boehmke and Patty (2007) did not construct their model with legislative referendums in mind, their model suggests that individuals can infer that state legislatures propose and policies that are beneficial to a substantial part of the population.

Table 1 – Average Treatment Effect of Legislative Endorsement

	No Legislative Endorsement	Legislative Endorsement	Difference
<b>Amendment 1 (2000) - Redevelopment Districts</b>			
Favor	64.2% (237)	66.4% (267)	2.2%
Oppose	23.9% (88)	21.9% (88)	-2.0%
Don't Know	11.9% (44)	11.7% (47)	-0.2%
<b>Amendment 2 (2000) - Property Tax Limitation</b>			
Favor	63.4% (232)	66.9% (269)	3.5%
Oppose	28.4% (104)	29.1% (117)	0.7%
Don't Know	8.2% (30)	4.0% (16)	-4.2%
<b>Amendment 3 (2000) - Non Partisan Judicial Elections</b>			
Favor	44.8% (165)	47.0% (188)	1.8%
Oppose	36.4% (134)	32.0% (128)	-3.9%
Don't Know	18.8% (69)	21.0% (84)	2.2%
<b>Amendment 1 (2006) - Charity Bingo Exemption</b>			
Favor	69.1% (259)	66.9% (261)	-2.2%
Oppose	27.2% (102)	27.2% (106)	0.0%
Don't Know	3.7% (14)	5.9% (23)	2.2%
<b>Amendment 1 (2010) - Hunting Rights</b>			
Favor	71.1% (266)	71.8% (278)	0.7%
Oppose	16.0% (60)	17.1% (66)	1.0%
Don't Know	12.8% (48)	11.1% (43)	-1.7%

Note: Number of observations in parentheses.

Table 2 – Logit Regression Analysis of Legislative Endorsements on Referendums

	Amendment 1 (2000) Redevelopment Districts	Amendment 2 (2000) Property Tax Limitation	Amendment 3 (2000) Non-Partisan Judicial Elections	Amendment 1 (2006) Charity Bingo Exemption	Amendment 1 (2010) Hunting Rights
Legislative Cue	0.10 (0.19)	-0.00 (0.18)	0.09 (0.18)	-0.01 (0.18)	0.10 (0.22)
Democrat	0.57* (0.22)	-0.31 (0.20)	-0.47* (0.21)	0.04 (0.21)	-0.16 (0.25)
Republican	0.14 (0.25)	-0.20 (0.24)	-0.77** (0.24)	-0.70** (0.22)	0.15 (0.29)
Age	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Education	0.15 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	0.06 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)
Income	0.08 (0.06)	0.12* (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.06)
Constant	0.54 (0.49)	1.06 (0.45)	-0.58 (0.45)	1.40 (0.50)	1.99 (0.54)
Pseudo- $R^2$	.03	.01	.03	.02	.01
N	594	622	541	638	572

Note: Excluded category is Independent voters who did not receive the legislative cue. Standard errors in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 3 – Predicted Probability of Supporting the Referendums

	No Cue	Legislative Cue	Difference
Amendment 1 (2000) Redevelopment Districts	74.8%	76.6%	1.8%
Amendment 2 (2000) Property Tax Limitation	68.3%	68.2%	-0.1%
Amendment 3 (2000) Non-Partisan Judicial Elections	57.4%	59.6%	2.2%
Amendment 1 (2006) Charity Bingo Exemption	71.6%	71.5%	-0.1%
Amendment 1 (2010) Hunting Rights	80.5%	82.3%	1.7%

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## Appendix A – Question Wording

*Party Identification:* Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

*Education:* Which of the following education categories best describes your level of schooling. Is it --- and I have a list here, so please feel free to stop me at any time --

No High School  
Some High School  
High School Graduate or Equivalent  
Some College Including Business or Trade Schools  
College Graduate  
Some Graduate School  
Graduate or Professional Degree

*Income:* Which of the following income categories best describes your total PREVIOUS YEAR household income? Was it - and I have a list here ... please feel free to stop me at any time:

\$7,500 or less  
\$7,501 to \$15,000  
\$15,001 to \$25,000  
\$25,001 to \$35,000  
\$35,001 to \$50,000  
\$50,001 to \$75,000  
\$75,001 to \$100,000  
\$100,001 or over?

*Age:* In what year were you born?

## Appendix B – Demographic Comparison of Survey Sample to Arkansas Demographics

### 2000 Survey Experiment

	Survey	2000 Census
Female	56.5%	51.2%
Race		
White	83%	80%
Black	8.8%	15.7%
Hispanic	1.4%	3.2%
Asian	0.5%	0.8%
Age (Median)	48	36
Income (Median)	\$25,000-35,000	\$32,182
HS Diploma or Higher, Age > 25 Years	89.8%	66.3%

Note: 2000 Census data available: <http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html>

### 2006 Survey Experiment

	Survey	2005-2009 ACS
Female	59.3%	51.1%
Race		
White	83.8%	78.5%
Black	9.2%	15.5%
Hispanic	1.8%	5.4%
Asian	0.3%	1.1%
Age (Median)	54	36.9
Income (Median)	\$35,001-50,000	\$38,542
HS Diploma or Higher, Age >25	91.6%	81.3%

Note: 2005-2009 American Community Survey available: <http://www.census.gov/acs/www/>

## 2010 Survey Experiment

	Survey	2010 Census
Female	52%	50.9%
Race		
White	81.2%	77%
Black	8.7%	15.4%
Hispanic	3.4%	6.4%
Asian	0.5%	1.2%
Age (Median)	57	36.9
Income (Median)	\$35,001-50,000	\$37,888
HS Diploma or Higher, Age >25	85.7%	81.3%

Note: 2010 Census data available: <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/05000.html>; Age based on 2005-2009 American Community Survey.